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HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: To PROTECT STATE
SOVEREIGNTY
DR. JASMEET GULATI* AND IVAN KHOSA**

I.

INTRODUCTION

Is itpossible to resist evil without succumbing to the dangers of
righteousness?
This question, posed by Tzvetan Todorov, aptly sums up the debate over the
issue of humanitarian intervention.' The heart of the debate is the perceived
conflict between the notion of state sovereignty and the concept of humanitarian
intervention. While NATO's intervention in Kosovo was seen as a direct attack
upon the state sovereignty, the silence of the international community to intervene
in Rwandan genocide at the same time has also been criticized as a failure of the
community of nations to protect the lives of those people. Many jurists seem to
contend that these two concepts can never co-exist.2 They hold humanitarian
intervention as inconsistent with the concept of sovereignty. However, as former
Secretary-General Kofi Annan asserted in September 1999, "if humanitarian
intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we
respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica-to gross and systematic violations of
human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?" 3
This paper does not intend to suggest that the principle of sovereignty of
individual states is violable in favor of humanitarian intervention. Rather, it tries
to demonstrate that when an authority appointed to enforce sovereignty starts to
violate that sovereignty, the international community must step in to stop the
violation of this impregnable principle. This argument centrally rests on a standard
assumption that the concept of sovereignty is separable from the authority
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1. Jennifer M. Welsh, Conclusion: Humanitarian Intervention After 11 September, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 176 (Jennifer M. Welsh ed., 2004)

[hereinafter Welsh, After 11 September] (quoting Tzvetan Todorov, Amnesty Lectures (Feb. 1, 2001)).
2. INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO

PROTECT 1-2 (2001) [hereinafter ICISS REPORT], available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICIS
S%20Report.pdf.
3. Id. at 2.
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appointed as sovereign. The authority appointed as a sovereign is the one
governing its people, and could be termed as government. The purpose of
government is to secure the people's rights. Thus, the sovereign is meant to
protect the rights and interests of its citizens. Therefore, if the sovereign engages
in policies that threaten the basic purpose for the enforcement of sovereignty, he
will be said to be violating the sovereignty of his state and his people. Due to this,
sovereignty can no longer vest in its violator, and he will not be able use its
inviolability as a defense when international actors intervene on humanitarian
grounds to protect the sovereignty of that state by preventing the ruling sovereign
from violating it. This paper will also explicate the basic purpose of sovereignty
along with the principles of self-determination, non-intervention, and Article 2(4)
of the U.N. Charter along with various moral and ethical limitations in the context
of humanitarian intervention.
A. Research Methodology

This paper is divided into four sections. The first section discusses the basic
concept of humanitarian intervention. Here, we will argue that the basic criticism
of this concept revolves around the principle of state sovereignty. The second
section tries to delineate the core features of sovereignty that have survived the
interpretations of numerous jurists throughout history. The third section discusses
the legality of humanitarian intervention by testing its validity using the core
features of sovereignty in light of other principles, including self-determination
and non-intervention. The final section highlights the emerging doctrine of
responsibility to protect and its acceptance of a genial relation between the concept
of sovereignty and humanitarian intervention.
B. Scope and Limitations

The research is limited to only one aspect of humanitarian intervention,
namely, its relation with the concept of sovereignty. Most of the issues raised in
this paper are only incidental to this main issue of sovereignty and its relation to
humanitarian intervention. In this paper we do not deal with other disputes
regarding humanitarian intervention-for example, the debate whether sufficient
state practice and opinio juris exists to establish humanitarian intervention as a
customary law or not. Also, because the topic of sovereignty is very vast and
extensive, the research is limited to only a few important jurists of sovereignty, and
further, to only their main ideas.
II.

THE CONCEPT OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

In the last two decades, the issue of humanitarian intervention has emerged as
one of the most hotly debated topics amongst both theorists and practitioners of
international law.4 This paper seeks to answer one straightforward question-is

4. Jennifer M. Welsh, Introduction, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 1 (Jennifer M. Welsh ed., 2004).
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there actually any conflict between the concept of humanitarian intervention and
the protection of state sovereignty, especially in the situation of grave humanitarian
crises that is posed by the ruling sovereign himself? However, before starting with
the main arguments, it is important to define the concept of humanitarian
intervention in order to make clear the end and scope of the matter that is to be
discussed.
A. HumanitarianInterventionDefined
J. L. Holzgrefe defines humanitarian intervention as:
[T]he threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of
states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of
the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens,
without the permission of the government of the state within whose
territory force is applied.5
According to James Pattison, there are four defining conditions of
humanitarian intervention.6 First, humanitarian intervention is always a forcible
military intervention that is carried out without the consent of the government of
the state. The lack of consent and forcible nature distinguishes it from the
humanitarian assistance, which involves relief work done by international actors
(mainly non-governmental organizations such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross or Oxfam) that is done with the consent or at the request of the
government.8 The second defining condition is that "humanitarian intervention
takes place where there is actual or impending grievous suffering or loss of life." 9
Intervention after the occurrence is not allowed.
Third, humanitarian intervention must have a humanitarian purpose.10 It
should only be carried out with the purpose of "preventing, reducing, or halting
actual or impending loss of life and human suffering.""
This also means
intervention that is mainly for self-defense may not be a humanitarian intervention.
The use of force in self-defense has its origin in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,
wherein use of force is legal only if the armed attack has occurred against the state
using force. 12 The use of force in humanitarian intervention is merely for the
protection against violations of human rights in another state.13 This feature
distinguishes between a humanitarian intervention and the War on Terror. While
humanitarian intervention is aimed toward protecting against loss of life in the
5. J. L. Holzgrefe, The Humanitarian Intervention Debate, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 15, 18 (J. L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003).
6. JAMES PATTISON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT:
WHO SHOULD INTERVENE 25 (2010).

7. Id.
8. Id. at 26.
9. Id. at 27.

10. Id. at 27.
11. Id.
12. U.N. Charter art. 51.
13. PATTISON, supra note 6, at 27.
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target state, the War on Terrorism is mainly concerned with eliminating the risk
posed by some militants of the target state to the citizens of the intervening state.14
Thus, the War on Terror may be argued as being limited only to self-defense.
Finally, humanitarian intervention is always carried out by an external power.' 5 A
state using force to protect its own territory from rebels is not an example of a
humanitarian intervention, as it comes under the domestic jurisdiction of a state.1 6
B. Sovereignty: The Biggest Limitation In The Legitimacy OfHumanitarian
Intervention
It is conspicuous that the acceptability of the concept of humanitarian
intervention can only rest upon its legal validity.' 7 It seems that any test for
corroborating or refuting the legality of humanitarian intervention mainly rests
upon the interpretation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which has codified the
customary norms of "state sovereignty" and "non-intervention."' 8
Proponents in favor of establishing the legitimacy of humanitarian
intervention argue that Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter does not expressly bar
humanitarian intervention because the prohibition under Article 2(4) of the Charter
only applies when the use of force is in a "manner inconsistent with the [p]urposes
of the United Nations." 9 However, the duty to prevent human rights violations is
consistent with the aforementioned purposes. 20 This is because preventing these
violations is, at its essence, about "reaffirm[ing] faith in fundamental human
rights" and "sav[ing] succeeding generations from the scourge of war," text that is
found in the Preamble to the U.N. Charter and is indicative of the purposes of the
United Nations. 2 1 This is highlighted in Article 1(3) of the Charter.22
Other provisions of the U.N. Charter, such as Article 5523 and 56,24 also
reflect the importance of protecting human rights as a fundamental purpose and
14. See Welsh, After 11 September, supra note 1, at 180-83.
15. PATTISON, supra note 6, at 27.

16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Henry Shue, Limiting Sovereignty, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 11, 14-15 (Jennifer M. Welsh ed., 2004) (describing intervention by

another state more as a "qualified prerogative" than a right).
18. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.").
19. Id.
20. See Sarah Joseph & Joanna Kyriakakis, The United Nations and Human Rights, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1, 1-2 (Sarah Joseph & Adam McBeth eds.,
2010).
21. U.N. Charter pmbl.
22. Id. art. 1, para. 3 ("The Purposes of the United Nations are ... [t]o achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character,
and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.").
23. Id. art. 55 ("With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote . .. universal respect for, and
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objective of the United Nations. Another argument justifying the validity of
humanitarian intervention relates to the customary nature of humanitarian
intervention and how it is validated by state practice and opiniojuris.25 A foreign
office minister of the United Kingdom wrote that a limited use of force without the
Security Council's express authorization is justifiable in support of the purpose
laid down by the Council when that is the only means to avert an immediate and
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.26
Critics of humanitarian intervention have also used Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter to formulate a major criticism that directly attacks the validity of
humanitarian intervention.
According to these critics, the principle of
humanitarian intervention conflicts with the principle of sovereignty of a state,
which is considered to be inviolable.2 7 The principle of the inviolability of
sovereignty is codified in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter,28 which expressly
prohibits the use of force against the sovereignty and integrity of a state. Critics of
humanitarian intervention argue that since Article 2(4) is ajus cogens norm, 29 and
thus, that it imposes an absolute restriction on humanitarian intervention. 30
Moreover, they also reject the argument relating to customary nature of
humanitarian intervention on the premise that humanitarian intervention cannot
become a customary law because it conflicts with the jus cogens norm of territorial
sovereignty. 3 '
Countering this criticism, the central thesis of this paper is built around the
concept of sovereignty, discussing it thoroughly in subsequent parts. But before
discussing this thesis, let us look at the second criticism regarding the ethics of
humanitarian intervention. This criticism deals with the actual motive of the

observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion.").
24. Id. art. 56 ("All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation
with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.").
25. State practice prior to the U.N. Charter may include British, French and Russian intervention
in Greece (1827), American intervention in Cuba (1898), French intervention in Syria (1860), and
Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian intervention in Macedonia (1912). State practice after the adoption of the
U.N. Charter may include NATO's intervention in Kosovo (1999), intervention in Iraq by western
troops (1991), and U.N. intervention in Somalia under Security Council Resolution 794 (1992).
26. See Geoffrey Marston, United Kingdom Materialon InternationalLaw 1999, 1999 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 387, 587 (1999).
27. Sir Adam Roberts, The United Nations and HumanitarianIntervention, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 71, 76 (Jennifer M. Welsh ed., 2004).
28. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
29. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
1 190 (June 27) (separate opinion of Judge Nagendra Singh) (holding that the prohibition of the use of
force against territorial sovereignty is ajus cogens norm).
30. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 27.
31. The second argument was also rejected by another counter-argument citing that none of the
intervention that took place after the Charter was adopted was held legal by the international committee,
even though none of it was severely condemned by the Security Council of the U.N. This argument is
not dealt in detail in this paper, as it is secondary to the argument of inviolability of sovereignty and
requires its own separate research.
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intervening state. Critics argue that a state is primarily concerned with the interests
of its own citizens, whereas the interests of the citizens of the other state are
always secondary in nature. 32 Therefore, a state would never engage in
humanitarian intervention, as it is not beneficial for its own citizens.33
However, James Pattison has tried to counter this argument by distinguishing
between the intentions of the intervening state, and its corresponding motives for
the intervention.34 Pattison argues that the "intentions" of the intervening state
means having a humanitarian purpose of "preventing, reducing, or halting the

humanitarian crisis," whereas a "motive" is the "underlying reason for undertaking
the humanitarian intervention. "35 This "reason" may involve considerations such
as political gains to ending regional animosity.36 Critics argue that because no
state possesses a genuine and selfless humanitarian motive for intervention, there
can be no such thing as humanitarian intervention.37 On the contrary, Pattison
argues, "humanitarian motives, unlike humanitarian intentions, are not a defining
condition of 'humanitarian' intervention."3 8 He continues by explaining "an
intervener can be engaged in 'humanitarian intervention' without possessing a
humanitarian motive."39 Moreover, since it is very difficult to determine true
motives of the intervening state, humanitarian motives have little definitional or
normative significance. Therefore, until the intervening state possesses genuine
humanitarian intentions, we can say that the humanitarian intervention is genuine.
As such, it is quite evident that the only major hindrance in the interpretation
of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter as supporting humanitarian intervention is the
limited and parochial interpretation of the term "sovereignty." If this limitation is
removed, then a sound, persuasive, and legally based argument can be constructed
in support of humanitarian intervention. Other concerns, such as the relation of
humanitarian intervention to the concepts of self-determination and nonintervention, are all incidental to the main limitation of sovereignty, and are
addressed along with it. The subsequent parts of this paper will explore whether
the true concept of sovereignty actually poses a limitation to humanitarian
intervention.
III. UNDERSTANDING SOVEREIGNTY

Professor Henry Shue argues that "[t]he sovereign state is a historically recent
and contingent form of human organization, invented in modem Europe and
largely imposed by Europeans upon the remainder of the modem world." 40 It is a
32. K Mills, Sovereignty Eclipsed?: The Legitimacy of Humanitarian Access and Intervention, J.
OF HUMANITARlAN AsSISTANCE (July 4, 1997), http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/l 11.
33. PATTISON, supra note 6, at 132-33.
34. Id. at 154.
35. Id. at 154-55.
36. Id. at 154.
37. Id. at 155.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Shue, supra note 17, at 11.

2013

To PROTECT STATE SOVEREIGNTY

403

highly complex concept both for political thinkers and legal jurists that has many
definitions, many of them also contradicting each other.41 Since humanitarian
intervention has a relationship with the concept of sovereignty, to begin, let us
evaluate the core aspects of sovereignty.
A. Core Aspects OfSovereignty
There are four core aspects of sovereignty that are common to almost all of its
definitions and evaluations. Each will be addressed in turn to prove the validity of
humanitarian intervention.
1. Sovereignty Is A Power
Despite the changing definitions of sovereignty throughout history, one aspect
that is generally accepted by all jurists is that sovereignty is a "power." For
instance, Greek philosopher Aristotle, in his work Politics,recognized sovereignty
as a "supreme power existing in the state," which may be "in the hands of one, or a
few, or of many." 42 This power may vest in some person, in a group of persons, in
artificial institutions created by men, or even in the general will of the people, as
argued by Rousseau.43 At this stage, we can say that this power composes the
"intangible aspect of sovereignty," which is bestowed in the "tangible aspect of
sovereignty," meaning in the physical authority in the form of men and
institutions."

2. Power Is Vested Through Some Contract
The next question that arises is how this power is vested in different
authorities that are asserted by various thinkers. On this issue, "[tihere is a general
agreement in the postulation of an original contract as the foundation of the
sovereign power." 45 As argued by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau:
Whatever the divergence of opinion respecting the exact terms of this
contract, or the effect of the agreement when made, there is a general
admission of the formation of a contract at some time or other, in some
form or other. The contract might be one between government and
people, as argued by many of the Monarchomachs; or a social contract
organizing the people, followed by a further agreement between people
and government, as with Pufendorf; or, again, the single contract in
which the sovereign and the State are created simultaneously. 46
This aspect of sovereignty makes it quite evident that the sovereign power, or the
"intangible aspect of sovereignty," was originally separate from the sovereign
41. See id. at 13-14.
42. C. E. MERRIAM, JR., HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY SINCE ROUSSEAU 5 (Batoche
Books 2001) (1900).
43. Id. at 19.
44. See id. at 46.
45. Id. at 19.
46. Id.
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authority, or "the tangible aspect of sovereignty." The contention that the
sovereign authority is born with sovereign power cannot be upheld. The correct
position is that the sovereign power is delegated to the sovereign authority through
a contract, the nature of which is still disputed among various jurists.
3. The Sovereign Is Only To Enforce The Sovereign Power
As it is established that sovereign power is given to the sovereign authority
through some kind of contract, the question that begs our attention is why there
was a need to create sovereign authorities to which all sovereign powers are
delegated. French writer Philippe de Mornay speculated as to "why kings were
established in first place and for what essential purpose."47 He felt confident that
"men would not have surrendered their natural liberty .. . had they not anticipated
great advantages. ,,48 Roman philosopher Marcus Cicero tries to answer this
question by arguing that the final, and most important, development of a
community or a state is that "the various members composing it must come to an
agreement about the law which is to govern their conduct and relations toward one
another." 4 9 According to him, this led to the formation of a sovereign to make laws
effective in the realm of human action.5 0 In other words, the sovereign power is
given to an authority for the sole purpose of enforcing that power in the real world.
Thus, the sovereign authority is only a tangible representative of the "intangible
aspect of sovereignty." Sovereign authority only subsists to enforce sovereign
power. This tangible authority may change from a theocracy to an autocracy, or it
may shift toward a democracy, but its function remains the same-to enforce the
sovereign power, which is intangible and unchanging. Therefore, we can conclude
that the root of sovereignty lies in the sovereign power and not the sovereign
authority, which is a flexible concept.
4. The Sovereign Cannot Go Against The Objectives Of The Sovereign
Power
Because the sovereign authority is only created to enforce the sovereign
power, the question of whether the sovereign can go against the objectives sought
by the enforcement of sovereign power must largely be answered in the negative.
This aspect of sovereignty is otherwise known as the "rule of law." There are
disputations among various jurists regarding all the objectives sought by the
enforcement of sovereign power. Despite contradictions, one common objective
contained in all the theories about sovereignty and rule of law is "the protection of

47. Philippe du Plessis-Mornay, Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
RESISTANCE IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY: THREE TREATISES BY HOTMAN, BEZA, & MORNAY 169
(Julian H. Franklin ed. and trans., 1969).
48. Id.
49. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ON THE COMMONWEALTH 51 (Oskar Piest ed., George Holland
Sabine & Stanley Barney Smith trans., 1950).
50. Id.
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life of men," which is regarded as the most basic purpose for creating a state and
sovereignty.
Various jurists have unanimously held that the sovereign cannot go against
this objective. Jurists have tried to limit the sovereign in many ways to ensure that
it cannot violate this objective. For example, Johannes Althusius, the founder of
the concept of popular sovereignty, defined sovereignty as "[t]he highest and most
general power of administering the affairs which generally concern the safety and
welfare of the soul and body of the members of the State."52 According to
Althusius, the "government owes its existence to a contract which if not express
must be presumed, and whose terms if detrimental to the people's right are to be
regarded as null and void." 53 Hugo Grotius assumed that the "rules governing the
organization and behavior of states exist ultimately for the benefit of the actual
subjects of the rights and duties concerned, individual human beings."54 Further,
he tried to limit sovereignty by divine law, natural law, law of nations, and any
contract signed with the people. 5
French philosopher Jean Bodin, who
propounded the absolutist theory of sovereignty, also tried to protect the objective
of protecting the life of men by trying to limit the sovereign by "the laws of God,
of nature, and of nations."5 6
Many other jurists used the concept of "rule of law" to limit the sovereign
authority. According to them, the objectives for the enforcement of sovereign
power are the "laws," against which the sovereign cannot act. "Plato insisted that
the government should be bound by the law."5 7 Aristotle argued that the rule of
law is preferable, and sovereign authorities should only be made guardians and
ministers of law.5 8 Cicero, in his book The Republic, "condemned the king who
does not abide by the law as a despot who 'is the foulest and most repellant
creature imaginable."' 59 He observed, "[h]ow can anyone be properly called a man
who renounces every legal tie, every civilized partnership with his own citizens
and indeed with the entire human species."60
Social contract theorists also reflected this rule of law. According to them,
the state and the sovereign were created as a result of the "original contract"
between the members of the society.61 John Locke, an English jurist and a

51. See, e.g., ICISS REPORT, supranote 2, at xi.
52. MERRIAM, supra note 42, at 9.
53. Id. at 10.
54. Carsten Stahan, Responsibility To Protect: PoliticalRhetoric Or Emerging Legal Norm, 101
AM. J. INT'L L. 99, 111 (2007) (citing HUGO GROTIUS, DE MARE LIBERUM, ch. V (Ralph Dernan
Magoffin trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1916) (1609)).
55. MERRIAM, supra note 42, at 11.
56. Id. at 8.
57. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 8 (2004).

58. Id. at 9.
59. Id. at 11 (citing CICERO, THE REPUBLIC AND THE LAWS (Niall Rudd trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1998)).

60. Id.
61. MERRIAM, supra note 42, at 19.
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proponent of social contract theory, argued that the authority created under the
contract only has the "power to protect and preserve, not to destroy; hence 'it is
not, nor can possibly be, absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the
people."' 62 If the power is used for the general good it would seem to be almost
without limit. But, if the authority acts contrary to the contract and tries to
suppress the natural rights of the citizens, it will lose its sovereignty. Locke
contended that:
Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled standing laws,
can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government,
which men would not quit the freedom of the state of nature for, and tie
themselves up under, were it not to preserve their lives, liberties and
fortunes, and by stated rules of right and property to secure their peace
and quiet.63
Jean Jacques Rousseau limited the sovereign by his concept of "general will"
in which, according to him, the sovereign power lies, and according to which only
the sovereign can act.M Thomas Hobbes, according to whom "the sovereign
created by the original contract wields absolute untrammeled power," also tried to
limit the sovereign by binding his conscience by natural law, and giving the
individual the right to resist if threatened by the sovereign with death.65
Thus, it is evident that jurists never envisioned sovereign authority as going
against the objectives for which the sovereign power is enforced. The powers of
the sovereign are limitless until they conflict with the basic purpose for which it
was given unlimited powers in the first place. Henry Shue, while analyzing
Kratochwil's thesis, rightly points out that the right to sovereignty is a right to do
wrong, as any right to genuine liberty must be.66 "However, it is a constrained
right to do wrong; a right to commit some wrongs but not others." 67 A sovereign is
free to commit wrongs to the extent that those wrongs do not violate the basic
purposes for which sovereignty was created. The protection of life is unanimously
considered as a basic purpose.68 Thomas Hobbes made a prominent argument that,
"the creator of law cannot be limited by the law," and therefore, the law created by
the sovereign is always subordinate to him. 69 Applying the same logic, it can be
deduced that the sovereign power that created the sovereign will always be
superior to the sovereign's authority, and thus, the sovereign can never violate it.
The creator is always superior to the creation. If sovereign power did not exist,
62. Id. at 16.
63. TAMANAHA, supra note 57, at 49 (citing JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT
72-73 (1980)).
64. John B. Noone, Jr., The Social Contract and the Idea of Sovereignty in Rousseau, 32 J. POL.
696, 707 (1970).
65. TAMANAHA, supranote 57, at 47.
66. Shue, supra note 17, at 12.
67. Id. at 16.
68. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 2, at xi ("State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the
primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself.").
69. TAMANAHA, supranote 57, at 48.
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there would have been no need for a sovereign authority. Therefore, a sovereign
can have supremacy over the laws made by him but not over the law that made
him. This contention is also in consonance with the "Grundnorm" envisioned by
Hans Kelsen.7 o
B. The Sovereign Violating The Objectives OfSovereign Power
From the above discussions, we can finally draw two inferences. First, the
sovereign authority was only created to enforce the sovereign power in the realm
of human action. Second, the sovereign cannot go against the most basic objective
sought for enforcing the sovereign power, namely, protection of life of men.
Numerous jurists have asserted other objectives at different points in time that may
not be violated by the sovereign, but since the concept of humanitarian
intervention is concerned primarily to protect only the objective of protecting lives
of people, this paper will be limited to the above-mentioned objective.
The question arises as to what will follow if the sovereign authority violates
this basic purpose of the sovereign power. What if the sovereign becomes a threat
to the basic security and life of the citizens, when the sovereign was made the
implementer of sovereign power to avoid such a threat? Legal academic Fernando
Tes6n argues that "[g]overnments and others in power who seriously violate those
rights [which they were created to protect] undermine the one reason that justifies
their political power, and thus should not be protected by international law." 7 ' He
rightly says that sovereignty is not an intrinsic value, but rather is instrumental in
fulfilling its basic purpose. 72 Consequently, the sovereign power will discontinue
to be vested in the sovereign authority if that authority grossly violates the basic
purpose for which it was given power. This is in consonance with the contractual
laws of the civilized world, according to which a violation of the basic purpose
amounts to a breach of contract, resulting in its termination. This principle has
also been included in Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties,
enacted inl969." If the sovereign authority violates the basic purpose for which
sovereign power was vested in him, the contract vesting the sovereign power will
stand terminated. This contingency of sovereign power is also consonant with the
basic rule of equity that "to seek equity, one must do equity." A violator of
sovereign power can never seek its benefits or protection at the same time.

70. See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW & STATE 123-24 (Anders Wedberg trans.,
Russell & Russell 1961) (1945).
71. Fernando R. Tes6n, The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 93 (J. L. Holzgrefe & Robert 0. Keohane
eds., 2003) [hereinafter Tes6n, The Liberal Case].
72. For an extended analysis of this idea, see FERNANDO R. TES6N, A PHILOSOPHY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 39-66 (1998).
73. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(addressing the conditions for termination of treaties).
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IV. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION TO PROTECT SOVEREIGNTY
As contended, when the sovereign authority violates the basic purpose for
which sovereign power was vested in it, that authority ceases to be a sovereign.
By becoming a threat to the lives of the citizens, the sovereign authority ultimately
becomes a violator of sovereignty. Therefore, humanitarian intervention is sought
and carried out against this abuse of power by the sovereign authority. Hersch
Lauterpacht, in the sixth edition of Oppenheim's InternationalLaw, noted "when a
State renders itself guilty of cruelties against and persecution of its nationals in
such a way as to deny their fundamental human rights and to shock the conscience
of mankind, intervention in the interest of humanity is legally permissible."74
It can be said that every intervention is directed against the "ruling authority"
in which the sovereign power is vested. The only variable determining the legality
of that intervention is the relation of the "intervener" and the "ruling authority"
with the "sovereign power." If the sovereign power continues to be vested in the
ruling authority, then the intervention conflicts with the principle of sovereignty,
and the intervention constitutes one of the highest crimes of the international law.
However, on the other hand, if the sovereign power ceases to vest in the ruling
authority because it is violating the basic purpose of sovereignty and the
intervening state intends to protect this sovereignty from being violated by the
ruling authority, then intervention cannot be said to be violating the same
sovereignty, and thus it cannot be deemed illegal. Humanitarian intervention, as
argued by James Pattison, is only carried out to prevent gross violations of the
right of the people to life. It is carried out against the authority that has lost its
sovereign powers by violating the basic purpose of sovereignty and becoming a
Therefore, if humanitarian
threat to the lives of the people of its state.
intervention is carried out to protect against violations of the basic purpose of
sovereignty by the former sovereign authority, then by no logic of this civilized
world can the intervention be said to violate that sovereignty.
As argued earlier, a violator of sovereignty-the former sovereign authoritycannot invoke the protection of sovereignty at the same time. Comparing this to
the law of inertia or the law of friction, the concept of humanitarian intervention,
like inertia, will immediately come into effect as soon as the sovereign applies
"force" against the objectives sought by the enforcement of sovereignty. The
position of the principle of self-determination in relation to this has also been
subsequently discussed.
A. HumanitarianIntervention Only To Stop Crimes Against Humanity
If the humanitarian intervention is carried out to protect sovereignty from
being violated by the authority that has lost its sovereign power, one major concern

74. LASSA OPPENHErM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 312 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed.

1955).
75. PATTISON, supranote 6, at 23-24.
76. Id.
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arises as to the exact nature and definition of the offenses that can result in the
"sovereign authority" losing the "sovereign power," and thus, justifying
humanitarian intervention. When can it be determined that the sovereign authority
has grossly violated the people's right to life and has become a threat to the
objectives sought by the enforcement of sovereign power?
It is generally agreed that the determination of whether the sovereign
authority has become a threat to the basic objective of sovereignty should not be
left solely upon the judgment of the intervening state.n Further, a sovereign
authority cannot be said to lose its sovereign power for every wrong it does with
respect to the life of its citizens. Tes6n argues that "[a]ll regimes that are morally
vulnerable to humanitarian intervention are of course illegitimate, but the reverse is
not true."7 9 Humanitarian intervention, as further reiterated by James Pattison, is
only carried out to prevent gross violations of the right to life of the people.8 0
Therefore, to protect the international order, humanitarian intervention can only be
validated against those crimes that are well established in international law as
grossly violating the right to life of the people of the state.
Due to substantive progress in the legal jurisprudence of international
criminal law, all acts grossly violating the basic security and fundamental right to
life of the people are brought under the legal concept of "crimes against
humanity."81 These crimes are systematic in nature, their commission is
widespread and massive, and they are committed directly against the civilian
population.82 The systematic, widespread, and massive nature of these crimes
directly committed against the civilians bluntly violates the most essential and
basic purpose for which sovereign power was vested in the sovereign authoritynamely, to provide security of life to the population.83 According to Cherif
Bassiouni, these crimes are termed as jus cogens crimes because they "shock the
conscience of humanity.'84 Moreover, there is an emerging recognition of the
concept of erga omnes obligations-the obligations of a state towards the
international community as a whole-with respect to the commission of these jus

77. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 2, at 49.
78. See id. at 29; PATTISON, supranote 6, at 23.
79. Tes6n, supranote 73, at 98.
80. PATTISON, supra note 6, at 22-24.
81. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
82. Id. These characteristics have been discussed in detail in Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-941-A, Appeals Judgment, if 36-38 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 26, 2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-asjOO0126e.pdf. See also Prosecutor v. Dragoljub
Kunarac, Radomir Kovac, and Zoran Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1 -A, Appeals Judgment,
$$
93-98
(Int'l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
June
12,
2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/acjug/en/kun-aj020612e.pdf.
83. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 2, at xi.
84. Cherif Bassiouni, InternationalCrimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 69 (1996).
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cogens crimes.85 Crimes against humanity include acts like genocide, mass
murders, and mass persecutions. 86 The commission of these crimes by the
sovereign authority against civilians warrants humanitarian intervention to protect
the sovereignty of that state from being violated by the authority. In contrast, if the
intemational community fails to prove the systematic and widespread commission
of these crimes, then the intervention might not be considered as humanitarian.
B. HumanitarianIntervention Does Not Conflict With The Right OfSelfDetermination
The right to self-determination involves the right of the people to "freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development."87 Critics of humanitarian intervention may argue that due to the
intervention of a foreign actor, the right to self-determination of the people of the
target state is compromised. However, Michael Walzer, a strong propagator of the
right to self-determination, agrees "when the rights of individuals within a
community are seriously threatened, such that they are no longer truly selfdetermining, outside intervention to protect basic individual rights is morally
defensible." 88 Self-determination is all about giving people an adequate chance to
determine their political status. Crimes against humanity committed by a
sovereign authority are prima facie denials of this chance. The commission of
systematic and widespread atrocities against civilians by the authority means that
the right to self-determination of the people has been eclipsed by the authority. In
fact, humanitarian intervention, by restoring the sovereignty, aims at restoring this
cherished right.
International law has recognized the existence of the principle of
humanitarian intervention, wherein a state, which is not party to the conflict, "may
decide . . . to come to the aid of the dissidents and assist them in overthrowing the

established government or even establishing a new state." 89 According to Leslie
Green, "[t]his was one of the grounds put forward by India when intervening
operations in East Pakistan that resulted in the establishment of Bangladesh
1971, followed by the latter's admission to the United Nations regardless
Pakistan's membership and its right to territorial integrity." 90

C.
in
in
of

85. Id. at 66. For ergaomnes obligations, see Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (BeIg.
v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, % 32-35 (Feb. 5).
86. Article 7 of the Rome Statute discusses various crimes that fall within the requirements of
crimes against humanity while Article 6 exclusively deals with genocide. For further details, see Rome
Statute, supra note 81, arts. 6, 7.
87. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, March 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
88. Jennifer M. Welsh, Taking ConsequencesSeriously: Objections to HumanitarianIntervention,
in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 61 (Jennifer M. Welsh ed., 2004).
89. LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 68 (2d ed. 2000).
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C. HumanitarianIntervention Does Not Conflict With The Norm OfNonIntervention
Having discussed the nature and scope of humanitarian intervention and its
relation to the concept of sovereignty, let us now determine whether humanitarian
intervention is essentially in conflict with the customary principle of nonintervention. This principle is believed to have begun with the Peace of
Westphalia, drawn up in 1648 to end the Thirty Years War in Europe." John
Vincent emphasized that the principle of non-intervention functions as a protector
of state sovereignty.92 According to Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse,
this principle "protects the internal sovereignty of one state by limiting the external
sovereignty of all other states." 93 It can be understood that the principle of nonintervention customarily protects the sovereign power from the threats of external
authorities by giving legal protection to the internal sovereign authority.
However, this principle does not seem to apply where the threat is from the
internal sovereign authority. It should be born in mind that the purpose of the
principle of non-intervention is only to protect the sovereign power from the
external sovereign. Its provisions are silent where the internal sovereign authority
threatens the sovereign power. Here, the principle of humanitarian intervention
fills the abyss by allowing the external authority to protect the sovereign power
from being violated by the internal sovereign. If the internal sovereign authority is
violating the basic purpose sought by the enforcement of sovereign power by
committing crimes against humanity against its citizens and eclipsing the right to
self-determination, then the principle of humanitarian intervention is not in conflict
Since the basic purpose of both nonwith the norm of non-intervention.
intervention and humanitarian intervention is to protect the sovereign power, these
principles cannot be held to be in conflicting with one another. While the principle
of non-intervention protects the sovereign power from an external sovereign,
humanitarian intervention protects the same from the wrath of internal sovereign.
Both are complimentary to each other. One begins where other ends. Together,
they provide complete protection to the concept of sovereignty.
Furthermore, looking at the principle of the "use of force in self-defense,"
which if proved, absolves the liability of a state from the violation of the rule of
non-intervention, 94 Fernando Tes6n argues that the basic purpose of this principle
is to protect the lives of civilians and also to defend sovereignty. 95 As
humanitarian intervention shares the same purpose of protecting civilians and the
sovereignty, Tes6n states that "any moral distinction between self-defense and
91. Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: "Involuntary Sovereignty Waiver"Revolutionary InternationalLegal Theory or Return to Rule by the GreatPowers?, 10 UCLA J. INT'L
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 361, 374 (2005).
92. Shue, supranote 17, at 14.
93. Id. at 14.
94. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (providing this exception to the principle of use of force and nonintervention).
95. Tes6n, The Liberal Case, supranote 71, at 99.
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humanitarian intervention . . . has to rely on something above and beyond the

general rationale of defense of persons," and of the protection of sovereignty as
well.96
D. HumanitarianIntervention Does Not Violate The Jus Cogens Norm Given
In Article 2(4) Of The UN. Charter
In the light of above stated arguments, let us finally discuss the biggest
criticism regarding humanitarian intervention involving the violation of a jus
cogens norm encompassed in the Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.97 A plain
reading of this provision shows that it chiefly incorporates three rules: (1) a
prohibition against the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence (sovereignty) of a state; (2) a prohibition against the threat
or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations;
and (3) a general prohibition against the threat or use of force. 98
The first rule prohibits the violation of the state sovereignty. It is regarded as
jus cogens.99 It has already been argued that the principle of humanitarian
intervention is not a threat to sovereignty, but is instead carried out to protect
sovereignty from being violated by the ruling authority. 00 Therefore, first rule
given in Article 2(4) does not conflict with or invalidate humanitarian intervention.
The second rule prohibits the use of force in a manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations. Since humanitarian intervention is carried out to
protect the fundamental human rights of the people-which is one of the purposes
of the United Nationslol-the second rule of Article 2(4) also does not invalidate
humanitarian intervention.
The third rule deals with the general prohibition of the use of force. This rule
cannot be regarded as jus cogens because the U.N. Charter itself provides two
exceptions to this rule, namely Article 42102 and Article 51.03 On the contrary,
humanitarian intervention is carried out to stop ajus cogens crime, namely, a crime

96. Id.
97. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.").
98. Id.
99. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
190 (June 27) (separate opinion of Judge Nagendra Singh).
100. See discussion supra Parts III.(B), IV.(A).
101. See supranotes 20-24 and accompanying text.
102. U.N. Charter art. 42 ("Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may
include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the
United Nations.").
103. U.N. Charter art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.").
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against humanity.'0 Therefore, any law of lesser value conflicting with a jus
cogens norm has to give way to this norm.105 If these arguments are to be
accepted, then it is evident that Article 2(4) is not an impediment upon the concept
of humanitarian intervention.
E. HumanitarianIntervention:A Duty & A Right
After delineating the central argument that the principle of humanitarian
intervention does not conflict with the principle of inviolability of sovereignty, we
have outlined three issues with regard to humanitarian intervention. First, let us
consider whether humanitarian intervention is a duty or a right. From the general
discussion of this paper, whenever the ruling authority violates sovereign power, it
is the duty of the international community to intervene to protect the sovereignty.
As discussed in this paper, for this duty to arise, crimes against humanity should be
proven to have been committed by the ruling authority in order to provide
sufficient proof of the violation of the purpose of sovereignty.
However, Pattison argues that the intervening state should also have "the
right" of humanitarian intervention along with an existing duty.106 To have the
right to intervene, the intervening state needs to possess the qualities necessary for
its intervention to be justifiable.10 7 It needs, for instance, to follow international
humanitarian law, to be welcomed by the victims of intervention, and to have a
reasonable expectation of success. 108
Therefore, Pattison believes that to have a duty to intervene, the intervening
state would first need to meet these permissibility criteria so that it has the right to
intervene.109 The 2001 report of International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty ("ICISS"), The Responsibility to Protect, provided various
principles that need to be fulfilled by the intervening authority before, during, and
after engaging in humanitarian intervention.1 10
These principles include
fulfillment of a "just cause threshold," various precautionary and operational
principles, and the necessity of authorization from the United Nations."1
Second, let us address the consent of civilians who are being protected as part
of intervention. Critics of humanitarian intervention argue that the self-respect of
the people of the target state could get wounded due to the foreign intervention. 112
In response to this, Tes6n argues that since there may be a group of people that
benefits from a government prosecuting other parts of the population, the only
104. Prosecutor v. Kuprelkid, Case IT-95-16-T, Judgment, 1 520 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000).
105. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
106. See PATTISON, supra note 6, at 15-20.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. ICISS REPORT, supranote 2, passim.
111. Id. at xii-xiii.
112. Tes6n, The Liberal Case, supra note 71, at 106.
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people whose consent or opposition deserves consideration are the victims of the
ongoing atrocities. 13 According to him, no communal interest can validly oppose
the aid to the victims being persecuted by the ruling authority. 114 According to
Malcolm Shaw, "[o]ne variant of the principle of humanitarian intervention is the
contention that intervention to restore democracy is permitted as such under
international law."s 15 He notes, "[o]ne of the grounds given for the U.S.
intervention in Panama in December 1989 was the restoration of democracy."" 6
However, the international legal community has not accepted this contention due
to political considerations in defining the term democracy." 7
V. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION TO PROTECT THE SOVEREIGNTY & THE
EMERGING NORM OF RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT
To conclude, we will discuss the emerging doctrine of "responsibility to
protect." The "responsibility to protect" doctrine is a concept that includes, within
itself, humanitarian intervention as a duty to protect the sovereignty of a state." 8
The concept of "responsibility to protect" emerged in the 2001 ICISS report, The
Responsibility to Protect. The central theme of the report was "the idea that
sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable
catastrophe-from mass murder and rape, from starvation-but that when they are
unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader
community of states."ll 9 Commenting on this concept, the high-level U.N. panel
established that "emerging norm of a collective international responsibility to
protect," encompasses not only "the 'right to intervene' of any State, but the
'responsibility to protect' of every State when it comes to people suffering from
avoidable catastrophe."1 2 0 In September 2005, the concept of the "responsibility to
protect" was incorporated into the outcome document of a high-level meeting of
the General Assembly.121 Additionally, the U.N. Security Council made a
reference to this concept in its Resolution 1674, on the protection of civilians in an
armed conflict.122
The concept of "responsibility to protect" lucidly consents that sovereignty is
an intangible entity from which the sovereign is created.' 23 Furthermore, the
concept accepts supremacy of this sovereign power by stating that if the sovereign
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW (6th ed. 2008) (citing James Crawford,
Democracy and InternationalLaw, 1993 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 113, 113).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 2, at 69.
119. See id. at viii.
120. U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility:Rep. of the HighLevel Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 201-02, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
121. 2005 World Summit Outcome, GA Res.60/1, T 138-39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24,
2005).
122. S.C. Res. 1674, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (April 28, 2006).
123. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 2, at 69.
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fails to protect sovereignty, he is deemed to have forfeited its ruling authority and
the responsibility of its protection shifts to the international community. 2 4 This
principle is expressly included in the Constitutive Act of African Union.'25 Article
4(h) of this Act provides that there is a "right of the Union to intervene in a
Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave
circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity."126
Also, Article 40 and 41 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility requires the
state to cooperate in the situation of serious breach of a peremptory, orjus cogens,
norm.127 This principle of "responsibility to protect" still is at its infancy, but
slowly is congregating the general acceptance of international community.
VI. CONCLUSION: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION To PROTECT HUMANITY

The doctrine of "responsibility to protect," which has been recently
developed, may be seen as an effort to redefine the principle of humanitarian
intervention in a way that seeks to minimize the motives of the intervening powers.
There is no doubt that it reflects an important, influential trend in international
society, particularly in the context of U.N. action. Such responsibility lies not only
with states, but also with the U.N., which includes a commitment to reconstruction
after intervention. The responsibility of states to protect human rights creates a
broad obligation, and it is to that extent that humanitarian intervention can be seen
as the responsibility of states to overcome the issue of sovereignty wherein the
sovereign authority itself abuses fundamental human rights of its people.
Tes6n rightly states that a "gross violation of human rights is not only an
obvious assault on the dignity of persons, but a betrayal of the, principle of
sovereignty itself"'2 8 He argues:
The principle of non-intervention denies victims of tyranny and anarchy
the possibility of appealing to people other than their tormentors. It
condemns them to fight unaided or die. Rescuing others will always be
onerous, but if we deny the moral duty and legal right to do so, we deny
not only the centrality of justice in political affairs, but also the common
humanity that binds us all.129
This paper emphasized that the concept of sovereignty has never been an
absolute limitation on the humanitarian intervention. Vesting sovereignty in an
authority was never intended to make him invincible. As Henry Shue puts it:
If all of us do nothing to define and assign default duties for the case in
which a state does not protect its own people against [the crimes like]

124. Id.
125. Organization of African Unity, Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4, July 11, 2000,
availableat http://www.au.2002.gov.zadocs/key oaulau-act.htm.
126. Id.
127. Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d Sess., April 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, arts. 40-41,
U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, (2001).
128. Tes6n, The Liberal Case, supra note 71, at 110 (emphasis in original).
129. Id. at 129.
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genocide-even for the most common case in which the state is the
orchestrator of the genocide-then we genuinely are assigning the vital
interests and basic rights of non-compatriots zero weight in our
calculations about how to organize the planet, specifically how to
understand sovereignty. 1o
There should be no doubt that humanity is the founding pillar of any society.
No artificial concepts should be allowed, whatever they may be, if they challenge
the basic existence of humanity itself. Our arguments have demonstrated that the
ideal of humanitarian intervention is an important tool to establish humanity,
especially in today's highly polarized world. Humanitarian intervention has never
challenged the indomitability of the concept of sovereignty. In fact, humanitarian
intervention is a glorious invention of the neo-natural school, which reminds the
sovereign of its basic duty.

130. Shue, supra note 17, at 21.

